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Abstract 
In a social movement study, countermovement emerges when certain movement is 
considered to bring threat to the status quo or the current political and social 
condition. Social movement seeks for changing the existing situation while the 
countermovement pursues to keep it. As a result, the conflict between two 
becomes inevitable, where both will compete to win over the other. The existence 
of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Indonesia (HTI) for years is responded by some Islamic 
groups especially Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and its allies, as threat to the 
Indonesian life due to the idea brought by HTI. It becomes the root of conflict 
between HTI and other Islamic groups in Indonesia. This article aims to explain 
the conflict between HTI and other Islamic groups by elaborating the effort of the 
Islamic groups to counter the HTI narratives and mobilization by using 
countermovement approach in social movement studies. This article is a case 
study research and using mainly secondary data to analyze the issue. This article 
found that Nahdlatul Ulama as the main countermovement played significant role 
to counter Hizb ut-Tahrir`s religious and political narratives as well as its 
political mobilization.  
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Abstrak 
Dalam studi gerakan sosial, countermovement atau gerakan tandingan muncul 
ketika sebuah gerakan tertentu dianggap membawa ancaman terhadap 
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kemapanan politik dan sosial. Sebuah gerakan sosial berusaha untuk mengubah 
situasi yang ada sementara gerakan tandingan akan berusaha untuk 
mempertahankannya. Akibatnya, konflik antara keduanya menjadi tak terelakkan, 
di mana keduanya akan bersaing untuk memenangkan satu sama lain. 
Keberadaan Hizbut Tahrir di Indonesia (HTI) selama bertahun-tahun direspon 
oleh beberapa kelompok Islam terutama Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) dan sekutunya, 
sebagai ancaman terhadap Indonesia karena ide yang dibawa oleh HTI. Ini 
kemudian menjadi akar konflik antara HTI dan kelompok Islam yang lain di 
Indonesia. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan konflik antara HTI dan 
kelompok-kelompok Islam lainnya dengan menguraikan upaya kelompok-
kelompok Islam untuk melawan narasi dan mobilisasi HTI dengan menggunakan 
konsep countermovement dalam studi gerakan sosial. Artikel ini menggunakan 
metode penelitian studi kasus dalam penelitian kualitatif serta menggunakan data 
sekunder untuk menganalisis masalah ini. Artikel ini menemukan bahwa 
Nahdlatul Ulama, sebagai pemeran utama gerakan kontra, memainkan peran 
penting untuk melawan narasi keagamaan dan politik Hizbut Tahrir serta 
mobilisasi politiknya. 
 
Kata Kunci:  
Countermovement; Gerakan Sosial; Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia; Nahdlatul Ulama.  
 
A. Introduction  
In a phenomenon of social movements, when a movement is considered to 
pose a threat to existing social or political conditions, other movements will 
emerge to respond or oppose it or there will be a response from the state to either 
suppress or facilitate the movement. If the movement is welcomed by the state, 
there will be no conflict between the state and the movement. In contrast, if the 
state suppresses the movement, then a conflict between the two actors will occur, 
where there will be competition to win the political competition. Social 
movements will struggle to change and the state will resist and resist the influence 
of movements. The state will try to kill the movement; on the other hand, the 
movement will look for ways to stay alive until the goal is reached.  
Hizb ut-Tahrir is an Islamic movement that has gone through this kind of 
conflict between states and countermovement. As a global movement, which 
advocates for revolutionary change from the current modern state system, the 
Hizb ut-Tahrir is largely rejected by Muslim-majority countries, in West Asia, 
Central Asia, and North Africa. In western countries, HT is often depicted in 
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negative images such as radical groups and fundamentalists although it is not 
prohibited. This article attempts to discuss the relation between HTI and its 
countermovement by explaining the countermovement`s counternarratives and 
countermobilization to hizb ut-tahrir Indonesia.  
 
B. Research Method  
This article uses the case study method in the social science research 
method by taking a social movement issue with specifying on countermovement 
approach. This approach will be applied to describe the response of Islamic civil 
society on the existence of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Indonesia (HTI). Nahdlatul Ulama is 
put here as the countermovement to HTI.  To collect the data for this research 
article, secondary data is mostly used through the website, such as NU Online and 
other relevant websites, journal articles are also used that is relevant to this topic. 
All the collected data will be analyzed by classifying them based on the approach 
used in this article. 
 
C.  Result and Discussion  
 
a. Countermovement in The Social Movement Studies  
Countermovement emerges in social movement for two reasons:  because 
of the actions of other movements or because of the degree of success of other 
movements. Therefore, the rise of countermovement is the result of other 
movement activities. This, for example, occurs in the process of mobilizing 
certain movements to advocate for certain problems in society, which are often 
not accepted by all people or populations. Some people may think or realize that 
the social movement challenges positions, traditions, culture, and practices that 
are widely accepted in society 1. This awareness raises a motivation to counter the 
existing movement. The more increased movement in mobilization; the 
countering process will also increase.The definition of a countermovement 
                                                        
1
 Banaszak dan Heather 2010, “Explaining Movement and Countermovement Events in 
the Contemporary U.S. Women’s Movement,” in the American Political Science Association 
Meetings , https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1668884. 
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according to the dictionary of sociology is an "organized response to a social 
movement, with the purpose of blocking the movement's activities, resisting 
change, and presenting alternative points of view. Counter-movements may be 
spontaneous expressions of public feeling, or fronts for interest groups‖ 
(oxfordreference.com)". In a short definition, Turner and Killian define that 
countermovement as a movement mobilized against other social movements 2. 
The relationship between movement and countermovement is in a conflict 
relationship, where both compete to persuade people or authorities to support and 
follow their arguments. Moreover, social movements and countermovements 
imitate each other in their actions or strategies. In fact, sometimes both try to 
defeat each other. The existence of a countermovement is an obstacle in gaining 
the success of social movements. But if a countermovement act with violence, 
then it can also motivate social movements to become more radical 3.  
There are several forms of interaction between movement and 
countermovement according to Zald and Useem (1983). First, they could meet 
and debate in any place even on the road or public space or during a 
demonstration. They could also meet and debate in a formal forum such as 
debates on university campuses, TV, radio and so on. Second, Movement and 
countermovement compete in an effort to influence the same third parties like 
influencing the public, and the government. Third, Movement and 
countermovement, both compete to disrupt the effects of each other to make the 
movement ineffective or even dead 4. In Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama together 
with its under bow groups Banser and GP Ansor are the countermovement groups 
on HTI. NU has been long time to disagree with the idea of HTI but only under 
the regime of Joko Widodo especially in 2017, NU and its allies openly show 
their opposition and countering HT movement in Indonesia. The government also 
supports the countermovement activities of NU. The countermovement approach 
                                                        
2
 Lo 1982, “Countermovements and Conservative Movements in the Contemporary U.S.,” 
Annual Review of Sociology 8, no. 1 (1982): h. 107–34, https://doi.org/10.1146/ 
annurev.so.08.080182.000543. 
3
 Della Porta dan Diani 2006, Social Movements: An Introduction, Second Edi Blackwell 
Publishing, Oxford. 
4
 Zald dan Useem 1982, “Movement and countermovement: Loosely coupled conflict,” 
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will be used to discuss the reason of NU to counter HT and the strategies used by 
NU to counter HTI in Indonesia. 
 
b. Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia  
Hizb ut-Tahrir (the liberation party) was founded by Sheikh Taqiyuddin 
an-Nabahani (1909-1977), an Islamic scholar and judge. This party was first 
founded in Jordan and officially registered with the Jordanian government in 
1953, and later spread regionally in Arab countries and then entered over 40 
countries with about millions of members worldwide 5. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) as an Islamic political party aims to turn the present 
democratic structure in the Muslim world from a secular system to an Islamic one. 
HT claims that the root cause of the modern state, particularly in the Muslim 
world, is the acceptance of secular structures in social, economic and political life, 
such as democracy, liberalism and human rights. According to HTI, Muslims 
need to change the current system into an Islamic political system, which applies 
all aspects of Islamic law to solve all Muslim problems. HT argues that the only 
system recognized in Islam is the Khilafah system, which Prophet Muhammad 
and his companions inherited 6. 
To transform the secular structure, HT insisted, one must adopt the 
prophet's strategy of religious transformation: through intellectual and religious 
action, without resorting to violence. Based on the interpretation of the prophet 
method, HT concluded that there are three steps to change the political condition, 
first, the process of culturing, second, to engage with people in winning their 
hearts and minds, as well as cutting loyalty to the state and political system. 
Thirdly, creating a state in which applies Islamic sharia law7.  HT's hostility to the 
secular political system and the call for Islamic rule and the Islamic State are the 
                                                        
5
 Shiv Malik, “For Allah and the Caliphate,” newstateman, 2004, 
https://www.newstatesman.com/node/195114, Accessed 20 Maret 2019; Muhammad Muhsin 
Rodhi, Tsaqofah Dan Metode Hizbut Tahrir Dalam Mendirikan Negara Khilafah 2012, Al Azhar 
Freshzone Publishing, Bogor. 
6
 Hizb ut-Tahrir 2005, The Institutions of State, Al-Khilafah Publications, London. 
7
 Hizb ut-Tahrir 1999, The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change, Al-Khilafah 
Publications, London. 
Jurnal Al-Adalah : Jurnal Hukum dan Politik Islam 
Vol. 5 No. 2,  Juli 2020 : 171-191 
P-ISSN :2406-8802- E-ISSN : 2685-550X  
E-mail : aladalah@iain-bone.ac.id 
http : //jurnal.iain-bone.ac.id/index.php/aladalah 
176 
 
key narratives of this group. Consequently, It became controversial among 
Muslims, where many chose to support it group, and others criticized and opposed 
that group as well. In terms of the state's response to HT, this group has 
experienced various kinds of state oppression, including detention, murder and 
stigma in many countries, especially in Muslim and Arab countries 8. 
In the 1980s, HT started work in Indonesia and introduced by 
Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Hizb ut-Tahrir 
activists worked mainly through Islamic student organizations throughout 
Indonesian universities, and then expanded broader in the Indonesian community. 
HT publicly announced its work and ideas in Indonesia in 2000 with the 
organizing of the first International Khilafah Conference, attended by around 
2000 people. It was then followed by extensive interaction with the people of 
Indonesia through various events and programs including media publication, talk 
shows, demonstrations, and international conferences. All of these activities are 
instruments for Hizb ut-Tahrir to communicate its Islamic and political ideas in 
Indonesian people 9. 
c. Countering Hizb ut-Tahrir Narratives and Mobilization 
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HTI) has emerged in Indonesia for about more than twenty 
years, since 1980s but it worked underground until 2000s after Indonesian 
totalitarian regime, Soeharto stepped down. Since then HTI worked openly in 
propagating its ideology through many tactics and strategies such as producing 
leaflets, books, magazines; conducting seminars, conferences, public discussions; 
visiting prominent religious and political figures; attending government`s events; 
carrying out mass demonstration and cooperating with other Islamic groups in 
Indonesia. 
Since 2000s, Hizb ut-tahrir has become a very active Islamic organization 
in Indonesia and impact to the increase of the members and its sympathizers from 
                                                        
8
 Aswar 2017, What is Wrong with Democracy? A View from Hizbut Tahrir,” 
Transformasi Global 4, no. 1, 2017 
9
 Muhtadi 2009, "The Quest for Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia,” Asian Journal of Social 
Science 37, no. 4, 2009: 623–45; Yusanto 2013, “Capaian Muktamar Khilafah 2013,” hizb-
Indonesia, 2013. Accessed 30 July 2019 
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all level of society: students, teachers, lecturers, businessman, peasants and so on. 
Unfortunately there is no exact number of HTI members in Indonesia due to 
unwillingness of HTI leaders to reveal it. Some researchers only can estimate 
around ten thousands to one million members 10. 
The mobilization of Hizb ut-tahrir in Indonesia, and its objective to 
reestablish khilafah state have started again the discussion on the importance of 
this state in today`s world. Different responses have come from many Islamic 
groups, and scholar on HTI`s political agendas.  Some groups agreed with HTI 
including Islamic defender front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia (Council of Mujahiddin Indonesia, MMI), but others opposed like 
Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiah, the two biggest Islamic organizations in 
Indonesia.  
For Islamic Defender Front (FPI) and MMI, even though have the same 
dream of khilafah, both perceived differently on how to struggle for it. For FPI, its 
focus in the implementation of sharia in Indonesia is through gradual 
implementation.  
FPI believes that by supporting pro Islamist political candidates, Islamic 
laws / sharia can be implemented in Indonesia. Moreover the movement also 
involved in cooperation with the government: in the fields of social humanity, 
post-disaster relief, and social development. FPI also is well known as violence 
group for some of its action to perform what is called amar ma`ruf nahi munkar, 
enjoining good, and forbidding evil.  It then made this movement become 
controversial in Indonesia.  
On the other hand, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) eventhough it has 
the same rhetoric with HT on khilafah and stance on democracy. MMI narratives 
on Islamic state focuses on the Indonesian level, not transnational like HTI does. 
Moreover, the idea of establishing sharia is not manifested in every issues 
advocated by MMI, or in its collective actions. Different with HTI that links every 
                                                        
10
 Greg Fealy 2007, “Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia: Seeking A Total Islamic Identity,” in Islam 
and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West, ed. oleh Shahram 
Akbarzadeh dan Fethi Mansouri,  Tauris Academic Studies,  New York, h. 151–164. 
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issues on the need for establishing and implementing Islamic state or sharia 11. 
Whereas Muhammadiah and Nadhlatul Ulama, both disagree with the idea of 
sharia and khilafah of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Muhammadiah argued that Indonesia that 
exists today with its ideology and constitution are final form of Indonesia. From 
the Islamic point of view, Indonesia is not an Islamic state but it has been 
conformed to Islamic values. According to Muhammadiah, the main goal of 
muhammadiah`s work is to create the true picture of Islam through cultural 
approach not structural or political approach, that is why Muhammadiah does not 
have any idea to establish a sharia state or khilafah 12. Haedar Nashir, the current 
leader of Muhammadiah, statet that there is no place in Muhammadiah for those 
who have an ideology that against pancasila including khilafah, communism, and 
secularism 13.  
According to Din Syamsuddin, Khilafah is actually an important part of 
Islam that based on al-Quran and hadith but it does not necessarily mean that 
Islam has its own particular state. That is why; there is no obligation to establish 
an Islamic state for Muslim. Khilafah according to Syamsuddin is a symbol of 
unity, solidarity of Islam regardless the differences of language, and culture.  
Hence, the need for khilafah according to Din is khilafah as civilization not as a 
structure of state 14. Afterall, For Muhammadiah Indonesia is a state of consensus 
and witness ( dar al-`ahdi wa al-syahadah) that means that Indonesia was 
established through national consensus from all element of Indonesian societies 
and place of witness toward a state of peace, tranquility, developed, prosperity 
under the god almighty`s protection ridha Allah swt.  This principles, is said, are 
in line with the Islamic ideals of state to be “Baldatun thayyibatun wa rabbun 
                                                        
11
 Lajnah Tanfidziyah Majelis Mujahidin 2014, Lajnah Tanfidziyah Majelis Mujahidin 
2014,, Accessed 12 November 2019.  
12
 Muhammadiah 2018,Muhammadiah 2018,, Accessed 19 November 2019.  
13
 Muhammadiah 2019, “Haedar: Muhammadiyah Berpaham Negara Pancasila Darul 
Ahdi Wasyahadah - Berita | Muhammadiyah,” muhammadiah, 2019., Accessed 19 November 
2019.  
14
 Muhammadiah 2017, “Din Syamsuddin: Khilafah Tidak Diabaikan dan Pancasila Tetap 
Ditegakkan, Begini Solusinya - Berita | Muhammadiyah,” muhammadiah, 2017., Accessed 19 
November 2019. 
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ghafur”, a good state that is under the blessing of the god almighty. In doing that, 
the people of state should believe and pray to god, not committing crimes, 
perform good relation with God and other human being, and treated others 
equally, also always struggle to keep the status as the best ummah (khayra 
ummah) 15.  
However, in encountering the emergence of Islamic transnationalism in 
Indonesia Muhammadiyah propose to address it through comprehensive and 
peaceful approach. Muhammadiyah argues that Islamic method that is adopted is 
a peaceful and comprehensive method in addressing many social problems in the 
Muslim live. Islamic radicalism is only one issue but to solve that must be through 
considering many variables not only religion but also social, political and 
economic issues. Muhammadiyah also rejects to only denote radicalism to 
Muslim because radicalism can arise from all ideologies, cultures, and beliefs.  
In solving radicalism issue, Muhammadiyah contends, the approach 
should be based on law and soft approach that means, to carry out dialogue and 
integrate the extremists in the society. In contrast, using hard approach to the 
extremist and countering the radical narratives carelessly even can contribute to 
rise of Muslim opposition toward state and even can contribute to radicalize 
Muslim more than before. This narrative, that then makes Muhammadiyah very 
critical to the government`s policies on counter-terror and counter-radicalism 
agendas.  
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), on the other side, is very much more serious to 
respond the coming of transnational Islamic groups in Indonesia including HT, 
Salafism, Muslim Brotherhood, and jihadist groups. NU believes that those 
foreign Islamic groups can only bring threat and disaster to Indonesia because of 
their ideas and vision that against Islamic tradition in Indonesia.  
According to Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesian Islam is a uniqe form Islam 
comparing to the Islamic traditions in the Middle East. Indonesian Islam is the 
                                                        
15
 Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiah 2015, Negara Pancasila Sebagai Darul Ahdi Wa 
Syahadah , Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiah, Makassar  
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picture of the real Islam that is peaceful, tolerant, and inclusive. Also, Islam in 
Indonesia accepts the current form of Indonesian political structure: nationalism 
and democracy. Most importantly, Islam in Indonesia was spread through word 
not sword like in the Middle East. Nahdlatul Ulama contended that this unique 
form of Islam in Indonesia is called as Islam Nusantara. Whereas the face of Islam 
in the Middle East is very negative, conflict, authoritarianism, dictatorship, 
exclusive and intolerant.  
Hence, if now in Indonesia there is an increasing phenomenon of 
transnational Islamic movements from notably the Middle Eastern countries, it 
means danger to Indonesian Islam. Those groups bring their Islamic traditions that 
contrasted with Indonesian tradition. As a result, there should be no place for 
them to be free in disseminating their ideas and thought.  
Regarding the relation with Islam and the state, the leaders of Nahdlatul 
Ulama have discussed it clearly that Islam has no a complete concept of state 
format let alone to obligate its adherents to pursue it. This political and religious 
stance has made NU being able to compromise with any regime. Since founded in 
1925 this group, under the control of Dutch colonial regime, and under Japan 
control NU admitted the two regimes, even under Japan, NU leader was appointed 
to be the leader of religious affairs (Shumubu). For NU, the colonial regimes, 
Dutch or Japan, are legal and accepted regimes, and it does not change the status 
of Indonesia as Darul Islam (Islamic state), considering that there were many 
Islamic sultanates or kingdoms and as long as Islam is still easily practiced by 
Muslim. Moreover, Muslim should defend the state whoever the regimes are 16.  
After Indonesian independence, 1945, NU also showed its political and 
religious position that supports the newborn state. Soekarno as the first president 
was granted religious title as ―ulil-amri dharuri bis saukah” that means 
religiously accepted as Indonesian leader. Cooperative engagement with regimes 
then was still upholded by NU under new order (order baru), Soeharto and until 
today. 
                                                        
16
 Aswar 2015, “Organisasi Nadhlatul Ulama Memerangi Radikalisme Politik Islam di 
Indonesia” Universitas Islam Indonesia. 
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According to Abdurrahman Wahid, (1940-2009), the chairman of 
Nahdlatul Ulama (1991-1999), Islam never taught to establish a particular state, or 
an Islamic state system. For him, the establishment of an Islamic state would only 
make non-Muslims citizens as second-class citizens who would be eliminated 
including the non-religious Muslim. Wahid contended that Muslims need only to 
make Islam a part of the practice of daily life such as embrace tauhid, practice of 
Islamic sharia, help fellow human beings, professionals in work, including being 
patient in every disaster and test that occur. If all of the above values have been 
implemented, according to Wahid, the Islamic system is no longer needed; even 
to measure the level of Muslim`s piety or obedience to god is not by the 
realization of an Islamic system or state 17.  
Moreover, in Wahid's view, the history of Islam proves there was no 
single system that was monolithic, such as the absent of the single method of 
appointment of caliph (leader) from Abu Bakr to Umar bin Khattab, to Uthman 
ibn Affan and to Ali ibn Abi Talib and later rulers afterwards. Likewise, the size 
of Islamic societies is diverse from time to time. In the era of the Prophet 
Muhammad and Abu Bakr, the Islamic community took the form of a community, 
then turned into an empire in the era of Umar, and nation state in the era of 
colonialism. This diversity, according to Wahid, made the concept of an Islamic 
state unable to be developed 18. Therefore, According to Wahid, in the view of 
Islam there is no requirement for an Islamic system, which means that there is no 
obligation to establish an Islamic state 19.  
This argument was also similar with, Hasyim Muzadi, the chairman of 
PBNU 1999-2010. Muzadi argued, the ideology of the pro- Khilafah activists 
clearly threatened the unity of Republic of Indonesia, Pancasila and the 
Constitution because this idea did not originate from the traditions and culture of 
Indonesian society. These activists can only disturb the peace of the state because 
it only invites de-legitimation and deconstruction of an established and sovereign 
                                                        
17
 Wahid 2011, Islamku, Islam Anda, Islam Kita : Agama Masyarakat Negara Demokrasi, 
Digital Edition, Democracy Project, Jakarta.  
18
 Wahid 2011, op cit 
19
 Wahid 2011, op cit 
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state 20. Muzadi considered that there was a misinterpretation of the pro-Khilafah 
activists regarding the understanding of complete Islam (Islam kaffah). The pro-
khilafah movement believes that Islam Kaffah means that it must establish an 
Islamic government whereas, according to Muzadi, Islam kaffah is indeed 
mandatory but not unnecessary through Islamic government. "To truly Islam does 
not have to be with the Khilafah Islamiyah. Recognizing and obeying a legitimate 
and sovereign government is mandatory ‖ 21. 
Said Aqil Siradj, Chairman of PBNU (2010-now) has also the same 
opinion that the idea of the Khilafah which is international is illogical and rational 
because historically the Prophet never established an Islamic state; instead, the 
Prophet made the Medina charter as an agreement on which the legal basis 
governing relations between citizens of different ethnicities, races and his religion 
so that he can live in harmony and harmony. After the death of the prophet was 
not found a standard model of government, Muslims have been led in the khilafah 
system, the Emirate and even the sultanates whose numbers are quite large and 
mostly, according to Siradj, in an Islamic government where there has been a lot 
of bloodshed among Muslims themselves. So what is more important according to 
Siradj is that the leader is honest, fair, and serves the community well 22. 
Other criticism on the idea of Khilafah came from Idrus Ramli23, Ainur 
Rofiq al-Amin24, and Nadirsyah Hosen25. Idrus Ramli specifically wrote two 
books related to Hizb ut-Tahrir namely ―Hizb ut-Tahrir in the spotlight‖ or Hizbut 
Tahrir dalam Sorotan (2011) and ―The Effective Way to Silence HTI‖, Jurus 
Ampuh Membungkam HTI (2012). In general, those two books mainly rebutted 
HT`s Islamic narratives and the idea of Khilafah.  
                                                        
20
 Muslimmedianews 2014, “Pandangan KH. Hasyim Muzadi terhadap Gerakan 
Khilafah,” ; NU Online 2007, “Silakan Khilafah, Jangan Bawa Nama NU.,” . Accessed 15 December 
2015. 
21
 NU Online 2007, “PBNU: Konsep Khilafah Islamiyah Tidak Pernah Jelas,”., Accessed 15 
December 2015. 
22
 NU Online , “PBNU: Khilafah Islamiyah Celakakan Muslim Minoritas di Negara Lain,” 
Nu Online, 2007. , Accessed 15 December 2015. 
23
 A young scholar of NU, Secretary of the Bahtsul Masail NU in East Java 
24
 The head of PCNU magazine in Jombang, east java 
25
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Idrus Ramli rejects the struggle of the Islamic Khilafah based on several 
arguments.  First, the leadership required by Islam has a general meaning and 
does not have to be called a khilafah. Secondly, the obligation of Muslims to 
appoint a single leader who leads all Muslims in the world only applies when 
Muslims are able to carry it out, if it is not capable then the obligation is null and 
void. What is obligatory to appoint a single leader if possible is only through ahlul 
halli wal-ʻaqdi and figures that deserve to be leaders of the Ummah, besides these 
two are not required. So when there is no single leader, only two groups will sin.  
Third, citing the opinion of Imam al-Haramain al-Juwaini (1028-1085 
AD), that scholars do not forbid forming a leadership at the local level if within 
the scope of global leaders cannot be fulfilled. Fourth, that the era of khilafah was 
only 30 years old as the hadith of the prophet explained, the khilafah was only 30 
years after that was a kingdom (HR Ahmad and al-Tirmidhi). Fifth, when 
Muslims do not have a caliph, the prophet does not order to fight and participate 
in upholding a caliph even the prophet invites to stay away from groups that call 
for division like what has been told in the prophet hadith narrated by al-Bukhari 
and Muslims 26. 
While Ainur Rofiq al-Amin, specifically wrote to analyze critically HTI`s 
ideas on Khilafah in in his doctoral thesis which was published in a book, 
―Dismantling the Khilafah Project Ala Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia‖, or Membongkar 
Proyek Khilafah Ala Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2012. He also published some 
articles, and journals that objected hizb ut-tahrir`s idea. In his book, after 
discussing critically the arguments of establishing Khilafah and refuting it, Amin 
concluded, the concept of Khilafah in constructed by HT can turn to be semi 
absolute – autocratic political system. As a result, it can threaten the Indonesian 
political live and deny the founding fathers`a ideas and missions that built 
Indonesian based on diversity, and cultural wisdom 27.  
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Nadirsyah Hosen, on the other hand, insisted that no single system 
government in Islam except only government that has general meaning. While the 
kind of state, I depend on the ijtihad, or ulama`s decision on it. According to 
Nadirsyah, in Islamic history, there has been varies of state were implemented that 
called as Khilafah state. Indonesian political system is also the ijtihad of 
Indonesian ulama, which is also deserved to be denoted as khilafah with its own 
system and structure. Furthermore, Khilafah is actually the same with other 
system that has its good and bad side. There are many dark stories in the history 
of khilafah that same with other systems. Hence, according to Hosen, claiming 
that khilafah is the single best system is not a good choice 28.   
The response and critics of the idea of Khilafah is very much propagated 
from Nahdlatul Ulama leaders and members. NU looks very serious to respond 
this including the rise of HTI influence in Indonesia. Institutionally, the stance of 
NU on Islam and state and the idea of khilafah were declared in the Musyawarah 
Nasional Alim Ulama (National Conference of Alim Ulama) held in Jakarta on 1-
2 November 2014, which decided several important points as follows29: 
1. Islam as a comprehensive religion (din syamil kamil) cannot possibly miss 
the problems of the state and government from the discussion agenda. Even 
though it is not in its full concept, it is in the form of basic values and 
principles (mabadi` hasyyyah). Islam has provided sufficient guidance for its 
people. 
 
Islam sebagai agama yang komprehensif (din syamil kamil) tidak mungkin 
melewatkan masalah negara dan pemerintah dari agenda diskusi. Meskipun 
tidak dalam konsep penuh, itu dalam bentuk nilai-nilai dan prinsip-prinsip 
dasar (mabadi` hasyyyah). Islam telah memberikan panduan yang cukup 
untuk rakyatnya. 
 
2. Choosing the leader (nashb al-imam) is obligatory, because human life will 
be chaotic (fawdla / chaos) without a leader. This is confirmed by the 
statements of the leading scholars, including: a. Hujjat al-Islam Abu Hamid 
al-Ghazali and Shaykh al-Islam Taqi al-Din Ibn Taimiyyah. 
  
                                                        
28
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Mengangkat pemimpin (nashb al-imam) adalah wajib, karena kehidupan 
manusia akan kacau (fawdla / kekacauan) tanpa pemimpin. Ini dikonfirmasi 
oleh pernyataan para ulama terkemuka, termasuk Hujjat al-Islam Abu Hamid 
al-Ghazali dan Syekh al-Islam Taqi al-Din Ibn Taimiyyah. 
 
3. Islam does not determine let alone oblige a particular form of state and 
system of government for its adherents. The people are given their own 
authority to regulate and design government systems in accordance with the 
demands of the development of the times and places. But most importantly a 
government must be able to protect and guarantee its citizens to practice and 
apply the teachings of their religion and be a conducive place for prosperity, 
welfare, and justice. 
 
Islam tidak menentukan apalagi mewajibkan bentuk negara dan sistem 
pemerintahan tertentu untuk penganutnya. Rakyat diberi wewenang sendiri 
untuk mengatur dan merancang sistem pemerintahan sesuai dengan tuntutan 
perkembangan zaman dan tempat. Tetapi yang paling penting pemerintah 
harus mampu melindungi dan menjamin warganya untuk mempraktikkan dan 
menerapkan ajaran agama mereka dan menjadi tempat yang kondusif untuk 
kemakmuran, kesejahteraan, dan keadilan. 
 
4. Khilafah as a system of government is a historical fact that was once 
practiced by al-Khulafa` al-Rashidun. Al-Khilafah al-rasyidah is a model that 
is very appropriate to the era; that is, when human life is not under the 
auspices of nation states (nation states). At that time Muslims were very 
likely to live in a system of khilafah. When mankind is under the auspices of 
nation states (nation states), the khilafah system for Muslims worldwide loses 
its relevance. Even reviving the idea of the Khilafah in our time is a utopia. 
 
Khilafah sebagai sistem pemerintahan adalah fakta sejarah yang pernah 
dipraktikkan oleh al-Khulafa` al-Rashidun. Al-Khilafah al-rasyidah adalah 
model yang sangat sesuai dengan zaman; yaitu, ketika kehidupan manusia 
tidak di bawah naungan negara-bangsa (nation state). Pada waktu itu umat 
Islam sangat mungkin hidup dalam sistem khilafah. Ketika umat manusia 
berada di bawah naungan negara-bangsa (nation state), sistem khilafah 
untuk Muslim di seluruh dunia kehilangan relevansinya. Bahkan 
menghidupkan kembali gagasan Khilafah di zaman kita adalah utopia. 
 
5. The Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) is the result of a noble national agreement 
among the state founders. This state was formed to accommodate all elements 
of the nation that are very diverse in terms of ethnicity, language, culture and 
religion. It is the duty of all elements of the nation to maintain and strengthen 
the integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, every path and 
attempt to emerge movements that threaten the integrity of the Republic of 
Indonesia must be prevented. Because it will cause mafsadah (damage) and 
divisions of the people. 
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Republik Indonesia (NKRI) adalah hasil kesepakatan nasional yang mulia di 
antara para pendiri negara. Negara ini dibentuk untuk mengakomodasi 
semua elemen bangsa yang sangat beragam dalam hal etnis, bahasa, budaya 
dan agama. Adalah tugas semua elemen bangsa untuk memelihara dan 
memperkuat integritas Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia. Karena itu, 
setiap jalan dan upaya untuk memunculkan gerakan yang mengancam 
integritas Republik Indonesia harus dicegah. Karena itu akan menimbulkan 
mafsadah (kerusakan) dan perpecahan rakyat. 
 
6. Muslims should not be trapped in the symbols and formalities of a name that 
seems Islamic, but must commit to the substance of everything. Thus, 
fighting for the substantive values of Islamic teachings in a country - 
whatever the name of the country, Islam or not - is far more important than 
fighting for the upholding of the symbols of the Islamic state. 
 
Muslim tidak boleh terjebak dalam simbol dan formalitas nama yang tampak 
Islami, tetapi harus berkomitmen pada substansi segalanya. Jadi, 
memperjuangkan nilai-nilai substantif ajaran Islam di suatu negara - apa 
pun nama negara itu, Islam atau bukan - jauh lebih penting daripada 
memperjuangkan penegakan simbol-simbol negara Islam. 
 
Of the many Islamic groups or movements in Indonesia NU apparently is 
the most serious one to react with the existence of transnational Islamic 
movements, and its ideas in Indonesia, including HT, Salafism, and Jihadist 
groups. Comparing to Muhammadiyah as the second largest Islamic group in 
Indonesia, despite it also objects HT`s idea, countering HT`s idea seems not the 
part of this group`s main agendas in Indonesia. In Muhammadiyah`s website for 
example, there is no single article that specifically discuss the idea of khilafah, 
and to oppose hizb ut-tahrir. Muhammadiyah`s response to HT`s, mostly in the 
news report of Muhammadiya`s activities such as in the welcome speech of its 
executive leader, Haedar Nashir, Din Syamsuddin 30 . It also can be seen, in 
Muhammadiyah`s social media accounts, youtube, twitter, facebook and 
instagram.  
In Contrast, for Nahdlatul Ulama, through its medias and activists, not 
only has very strong opposition to HT, but also very active to counter HT`s ideas. 
Many books have been published concerning rejection and critic on Hizb ut-
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Tahrir including Idrus Ramli`s books, Ainur Rafiq Al-Amin, Nadirsyah Hosen, 
and Abdurrahman Wahid, 2008. There are also hundreds articles in Nu`s online 
media, www.nu.or.id, including lectures from Nu`s ulema in YouTube, not to 
mention other websites that affiliated with NU`s members31. 
The increase of Banser oppoosition to HTI`s events started in 2016 when 
HTI organized Muktamar Tokoh Umat (Conference of Ummah Figures) 1437 H. 
This event was prevented and protested by members of Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Banser primarily in the region controlled by members of the NU in the eastern 
part of Java as in Jember, Kediri, Jombang, Magetan, Surabaya, Tulungangung, 
and Bojonegoro 32.   
Opposition continued in 2017, even becoming massive and national when 
HTI held another event through a long parade entitled "Masirah Panji Rasulullah" 
or the Prophet's Flag Parade, which aims to introduce the Prophet Muhammad's 
flag. The event was held in many provinces and cities in Indonesia from April to 
May 2017. At the same time, in many places, Banser has also been preparing to 
mobilize hundreds of its members to block and stop the event. As a result, in 
many places, security forces canceled HT’s events or HTI changed places of the 
events due to pressure and threats from Banser. Some of the main places where 
Banser faced HTI were in Semarang (Central Java Province), Bandung (West Java 
Province), Makassar (South Sulawesi Province), Surabaya (East Java Province), 
Yogyakarta Province, and Jakarta. Banser actually did not act alone to contain 
HTI, but also supported and allied with other NU bodies such as youth 
organizations and NU students such as IPPNU, CBP IPNU, PMII, and GP Ansor. 
The culmination of the call and request for anti-HTI Hizb ut-Tahrir was 
held in June 2017, when around 13 Islamic social organizations allied in the 
Organization of Friendship Organizations of Islamic Organizations (LPOI – 
Lembaga Persahabatan Ormas Islam) gathered and expressed their support for the 
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government to dissolve the Indonesian HIzbut Tahrir. The Thirteen Islamic 
organizations were Nahdlatul Ulama, Islamic Unity (Persatuan Islam), Al-Irshad 
Al-Islamiyah, Mathlaul Anwar, Ittihadiyah, Indonesian Chinese Islamic 
Association (PITI – Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia), Ikadi, Azzikra, 
Indonesian Islamic Society, Alwashliyah, Tarbiyah Islamiyah Association, 
Islamic Union (UMI), UMI and HBMI 33.  
Demands to dissolve Hizb ut-Tahrir and opposition from members of 
Nahdlatul Ulama in many places in Indonesia were responded to and supported by 
the government through initiatives to make regulations in lieu of law (Perppu – 
Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang - Undang). This Perppu is then 
subsequently used to legitimize the dissolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, by the 
state. In this point, the countermovement to HTI, particularly Nahdlatul Ulama 
and its wings win its struggle against Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia.  
The reason of the state support to the countermovement rathen than to 
HTI, firstly because of state has the same narrative with the countermovement 
Islamic groups on the issue of radicalism in Indonesia. Indonesian government 
has been for a long time working to tackle the issue of radicalism and terrorism in 
Indonesia
34
.  
Responding HTI, according to Mietzner and Fealy, there was a fact that 
state and NU youth militias cooperated to contain HTI agendas in Indonesia 35. 
Furthermore, it was also admitted by HTI`s spokerperson, Ismail Yusanto, who 
stated that over 20 years, HTI worked in Indonesia but there was no confrontation 
between HT and other Islamic groups, except in 2016 that according to Yusanto, 
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was organized or provoked by the government 36. Under the administration of 
President Jokowi since 2014 until the second term 2019, Indonesian government 
has a close relation with Nadhlatul Ulama mainly in the issue of war against 
terrorism and radicalism. Nahdlatul Ulama has cooperated with the government 
agencies such as working with Badan National Penanggulan Terorisme (BNPT), 
National Counterterrorism Agency, Ministry of Education and Culture, and 
Ministry of Youth and Sport 37 . Indeed, in 2019, president joko Widodo has 
chosen Ma`ruf Amin, the supreme leader (Ra`is Aam Syuriah) of Nahdlatul 
Ulama, as his vice president for the president second term that according to many 
observers was merely strategy to contain the influence of radical muslim influence 
in politics during the presidential campaign and election38. 
D. Conclusion 
A social movement that pursues for social and political change will always 
face an opposition from other groups or countermovement including state. As a 
result, conflict between social movement and countermovement becomes 
inevitable. The two actors will always be in conflict until one loses and other wins 
the conflict.  
The conflict between HTI and the Islamic movement in Indonesia is an 
example of conflict between social movement and its countermovement. HTI 
works in Indonesian based on beliefs that Indonesia should transform from the 
current political system to Islamic political Islam. It becomes the main narrative 
of HT`s propagation in Indonesian society. On the other hand, Nahdlatul Ulama 
and its wings such as Banser and Anshor act as countermovement to HTI. In 
countering HTI political activities NU and its wings, counter the narratives of HTI 
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and delegitimized the idea of khilafah adopted and propagated by HTI. On the 
other hand, in 2016, these countermovements increase its countermobilization by 
stopping and disturbing HTI agenda in many places in Indonesia. Due to the 
active and massive counter to HTI, the countermovements, got supports from the 
state that decided to dissolve HTI with the security reason.  
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